The Common Critiques of Philosophical Marxism revisited

The most damaging contribution to the dismal state of Marxist theory and politics today is not, as the right would have it, the irrelevance of Marxist thought and analysis to current-day problems (or even any problems at all), nor is it the collapse or gradual 'bourgeoisification' of the Marxist-Leninist states. No, it is the tendency among young people and intellectuals in particular, occasionally (whenever it is opportunistically useful to do so) joined by labour union leaders and leftist politicians, to speak of "socialism" or even "Marxism" when addressing political opponents, without actually knowing what socialism or Marxism stand for. For far too many people these days Marxism simply stands for "old theory that strives for equality" and socialism means " being nice to the poor/weak". But that would be just a minor issue if these same people did not constantly insist on the necessity of "socialist" critiques of or answers to capitalist and liberal developments on the international stage, while at the same time not actually giving the socialist answer, but instead a vague, often ill-supported and ill-informed social-democrat one. This in turn causes many not on the radical left (and even some on the radical left), not of themselves acquainted with Marx et al. either, to consider Marxism either hopelessly stupid or hopelessly misinformed and outdated or both. And no wonder; if Marxism were really what they are told it is, their view of socialism would be entirely correct. Obviously, though, this view cannot hold. Marxism in fact does not consist of either "eat the rich" or "let's not ignore the poor", but it is a theory and a method, both utopian and scientific.¹ I hope to be able to give a general overview of both aspects of Marxism here and at the same time address some common critiques and responses, in a manner that should satisfy the interested intellectual reader.

First, what is the origin of Marxism? To understand the application of Marxism as well as the way in which it was developed by Marx and Engels, it is necessary to understand the philosophical background from which it departed. The 19th Century German philosophy was essentially both idealist and universalist in nature; that is, aimed at developing a grand theory that could apply to all of human history, based on the assumption that ideas (or Geist or God or similar metaphysics) were the prime moving powers of developments in the world, in the final analysis. The main and best proponent of this theory was G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), who developed a theory of history that saw all human development in social forms as a gradually improving state of the human 'world spirit', whose final aim is to fully understand its own position within history. In this sense the Hegelian theory of history is (perhaps to the surprise of liberals) strongly relativist, seeing history not as a gradual insight into Truth, as the Enlightenment thinkers had done, but as an improving understanding of the individual's subjective historical position. Only such an understanding of "where you stand" within history could be considered actual freedom, actual development of man.

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), a follower of Hegel belonging to the so-called "Left Hegelians", further developed this theory of history, but within a more (though not fully) materialist framework. Feurbach analyzed the historical development of religion and the role religion plays in the experience of man, concluding that the Godhood is no more than man's projection of his own nature. Now this is of itself of secondary importance to what I am expounding, so I will not delve further into the subject of Feuerbach but to note that he applied a materialist analysis of subjects such as religion and reduced it to "human nature", but did not go beyond it. There rested the last remnant of idealism in philosophy before Marx undertook his work: in the question of what "human nature" exactly is and how it relates to the material circumstances (to be understood quite literally) of the world. Incidentally, much modern debate also seems stuck on this point - take for example the libertarians, who follow Adam Smith in presuming man's "nature" as his rational application of greed. Or the discussions about cultural and moral relativism, such as whether it is fair to apply Western moral standards to, say, Arab culture since perhaps their "human nature" is really different from ours? Such debate rarely gets beyond 'gut feelings' about the subject.

This is where Marx started revolutionizing the worldview. He (together with Engels, at an equal level!) for the first and only time consistently removed the last vestiges of idealism from the theory of history as developed by Feuerbach, by positioning the 'content' of "human nature" in history. As the Theses on Feuerbach put it: "Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. (...) All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice."
To put it more clearly, Marx' answer to the question of what human nature is, the most basic question that is necessary to analyze what is possible (in turn the basis of all politics), is to understand human nature as determined by the social relations of man. Human nature then is not something of itself, eternal and determinant, but the 'social content' it has (as opposed to its evolutionary biological content) is determined by the place any individual has within his social relations.

So far so good. We first need to determine then what the social relations are in any given period. This, Marx tells us in the Critique of the Hegelian philosophy of right, is the "sum-total" of the "material conditions of life", also called the "civil society". But to analyze the civil society we must be able to find out what its anatomy is, of what parts and what processes this civil society consists. And this, Marx crucially explains, is the political economy.

Why the political economy? I will try to avoid getting bogged in the details (as given for the specific political economy of bourgeois capitalism in Capital), so I will simply follow the rationale as it stands. We start, when examining human social relations, with the individual. How does the individual live? He lives in nature, at once dependent on nature for his food and shelter and master over nature in being capable of using tools. How does he survive in nature? He cooperates with others in order to enhance his chances of survival (few animals live purely on their own, and no primates do). What then happens? A group is formed, in which each undertakes tasks to enhance mutual survival. This, then, is a group with social relations, since each within the group is no longer an individual qua individual as he was before joining it; he has become a member of the group and therefore of the group's 'framework', the social relations. What then determines who does what in the group (the division of labour)? The social relations, since it is only in the form of a network of social relations that the group operates as a group. This way we can conclude, without needing any kind of idealism (or any moral judgements for that matter!), that the social relations determine the political economy. Because what is the political economy? It is way in which individuals produce within the framework of their social relations. What is to produce, in this context? It is simply to ensure the means of survival, either directly or indirectly. Why indirectly? Because it is more efficient to distribute tasks within a group (later a society) than to have each individual do everything for his survival on his own. Does any of this contradict our economic intuition? No.

To recapitulate, an overview of what we have so far concluded. The philosophy of Marxism has a theory, namely the materialist conception of history (often called historical materialism). This is nothing else than analyzing history based on the insight that it is not any idealist form of itself (God, human nature, Reason) that determines things, but at the most 'bottom level' only the social relations of man that does so, and that this in turn generates a specific economic structure, and that this economic structure then enables (and requires) a "superstructure" of law, science and philosophy, as well as culture, where the latter is understood as being things like aesthetics and sports etc.
On the other hand we have the method, which is called dialectic materialism. This is nothing else than applying the insights of materialism consistently:
1) That no circumstance of culture or society etc. is immutable;
2) That any such circumstance or arrangement can be shown to have a material basis;
3) That since nature operates as a whole, and abhors a vacuum, all such material bases should be found in nature and man's control over nature;
4) That man has control over nature and uses this to produce for his own survival and advancement, at the same time being determined by nature in his being, that is in what you might call his 'natural aspects' (i.e. his body);
5) That all human thought and action is dependent on the state of these natural aspects of man;
6) That, finally and crucially, it follows from this that the way man changes nature in the process of production also changes his own being, which in turn changes both nature (due to man's power over nature) and the superstructure (due to it being dependent on the forces of production), through a dialectical exchange.

Now to address the first common critique of Marxism, now properly understood. The question is: does this mean that the Marxist theory of history reduces it to economism, that is that the economy can be said to be the sole or at least determinant factor in explaining historical developments?
The answer is no, in fact, historical materialism does not even apply "factor" thinking in its analysis at all. I will rely in my answer on G.V. Plekhanov's excellent explanation of this subject.² We start with the observation that in trying to analyze historical developments in terms of factors, it is never quite clear which factor is predominant, and which influences which. In fact there is such an intricate web of mutual influences of factors in any kind of historical development that any such effort will be utterly fruitless, unless there were to be one specific "factor" that pre-influences all others. This, we have seen above, already exists: it is the development of the social productive forces (as Plekhanov summarizes it). Can we then say that the economic theory or economic process of any given period is its final 'cause'? Not at all! For it is impossible to say that any one economic process (bourgeois capitalism, feudal trade, ancient slavery-based economies, etc.) is more 'in line' with the social productive forces than another. Yet changes occur and walking through history, one goes from one economic structure to another. It follows from this that such changes occur as soon as the economic structure is no longer 'correct' for the state of the social productive forces. (I will explain what this means below.)
So to come to the point, you cannot, when applying historical materialism, say that any this or that aspect of the internal rules of an economic system or even the system as a whole determine any given historical development. No, because these "factors" are themselves, as are via it all other things, determined by the state of the social productive forces. Remember the rationale? One always needs to produce, that is, to survive, and this is done within a network of social relations. This is the one underlying reality, the one underlying cause that never changes: you have to eat, drink and get shelter to survive, and you must produce to satisfy this need.

Then we arrive at the second common critique. How does society change at all then? Certainly we need to survive at a basic level just as much as we did in the time of Julius Caesar. If this is the underlying 'cause' of all development, how come there is any development?
To answer this, I will summarize a part of the young Habermas' insightful analysis of the subject, namely the part that answers this question.³ To put it short: the answer is what is commonly understood as 'technology'. To understand how this works, you have to recall again the rationale of the political economy as "anatomy" of the social productive forces as explained above. What we have seen is that man has power over nature, simply put by using tools to extract food, to build shelter, to construct new tools, and so on. In so doing as we have seen there is a dialectical exchange between nature and man, in that man changes "the face of nature" by application of these tools and techniques, and the state of nature in turn determines man because of the natural aspects of his being, namely his whole being residing in nothing but the body. To get what this effectively means, simply consider: if the local water source is so polluted by application of technology that it cannot be used, and because of it the human body dies, it is the exchange that has caused this to happen: the application did not kill the person, but the fact that man is part of nature did.
As man produces and exchanges production within his network of social relations, the ideas and insights he has with regard to this production also change. Here one can simply picture the infamous caveman Oorg, who invented the wheel while rolling logs of a hilltop. Or imagine Prometheus stealing fire from the Gods if you will. In any case, technological progress enhances (at least changes) the productive forces. Because of this, the economic structure also changes along with it. As we have seen in the rationale above, this will cause a discrepancy with what has been called the "superstructure", beginning with 'fundamentals' like law and science, and eventually even entering the domain of art and philosophy and other forms of super-reflection. What then occurs? A tendency will appear within society to change the old superstructure (still in the state it was before the new technology came into being) in such a way that it becomes in accordance with the new state of the productive forces, since it is those that determine all development. If the productive forces are hindered in their full efficiency and application by the old superstructure, it is the superstructure that will be torn asunder: people need the production to survive, and the more effective the production, the better the survival. Therefore, the old superstructure will be changed, and changed in such a way as to fit the new productive forces. This will then appear to many to be an "internal" change so to speak, a change that was the work of political parties or individual genius or cultural decay or whatever; but those applying the method of dialectic materialism will know better: it was made necessary by the social productive forces changing.⁴

Then we come to the third common critique of Marxism. Often it is asked in response to the understanding of dialectic materialism as a method: what to think of individual brilliance? Does it play no role in the developments of society at all? Does it not matter what I do? Is this determinist, or even fatalist? And finally, why be revolutionary if it depends on social productive forces changing anyway?
To answer this, one needs but understand one basic principle that eliminates misconceptions about the above theorizing. It is emphatically not the case that these dialectic exchanges between man's needs and his activities (nature and the social productive forces respectively) or between those and the civil society are consciously effected. Men do as they do, you might say, without necessarily knowing why it is determined that they do it in that particular way or because of that particular reason and not another. We can turn again to Plekhanov here.⁵ It can indeed be said that some specific aspects of specific developments in history are "accidental", in the sense that their exact content is not directly determined by the social productive forces. Plekhanov mentions the example of Cleopatra's nose being shorter, but many other 'alternative histories' can be construed. Yet such accident should not be misunderstood: it has two definite aspects. The first is that it is relative. What is accidental to one historical research question is not necessarily accidental to another, nor is the one thing accidental to People X necessarily also accidental to People Y in their understanding of their position in history. Quoting Plekhanov: "For the inhabitants of Mexico and Peru, the appearance of Europeans in America was accidental in the sense that it did not follow from the social development of these countries. But the passion for navigation which possessed Western Europe at the end of the Middle Ages was not accidental; nor was the fact that the European forces easily overcame the resistance of the natives. The consequences of the conquest (...) was also not accidental; in the last analysis, these consequences were determined by the resultant of two forces: the economic position of the conquered countries on the one hand, and the economic position of the conquerors on the other. And these forces, like their resultant, can fully serve as objects of scientific investigation." (By the last sentence is meant that they can be fully explained from the development of the social productive forces.)
The second aspect of the accident is that it is not really contingent itself either. Certainly Napoleon could have died of typhus before age five, and then he would never have conquered Europe. Certainly France might not have been able to conquer quite as much of Europe without him at its head. But nevertheless it was the state of the social relations that destroyed the French Republic, because the bourgeoisie demanded order; it was also this development which caused the Directoire to look for a dictatorial general to lead the nation (in fact Bonaparte was not quite the first choice either); and finally, the technological state of the French army at the time was such that it could defeat any enemy either way.
What it is necessary to grasp is that it is the state of civil society that enables the genius, whether artistic, military, political or otherwise. Certainly a movement with genius has more success than one without, at least faster success. But such genius cannot show itself if there is no opportunity for exploiting it in the first place. Von Manstein cannot work without tanks; Michelangelo cannot work without orders from a maecenas; Gandhi cannot apply pacifist strategy without an enemy under domestic moral pressure; Luther cannot reform the church without a political rift between German princes. Individual aspects (positive or negative, but I'll call it "genius" for simplicity) can show themselves only when civil society enables them to, and as we can explain with dialectic materialism, civil society is formed by the social productive forces. So to answer the questions, all but one: Yes there is individual genius, but yes, this is still determined by the state of the social productive forces.

This leaves the final question, which is that of revolutionary activity and fatalism. One could easily conclude from all the above that individual activity is useless, that revolution is nonsense. After all, it happens when society is "ready for it", and when it is, it will happen anyway, right? So why should I bother?
Yet this obviously mistakes the true Reason in history. It is exactly to counter such thinking that Marx wrote the last and best known of the Theses on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it."
Why? For the simple reason that history is made by humans. It is about humans. This means that you cannot wait for some force of history to act on your behalf while you were sleeping: such would be the utmost in idealism! There is no "ghost in the machine" of history. No, for a change in social relations to occur, it is the humans in those social relations that must do that; for technology to be developed, it is the humans that must do so; for the economy to be adapted and innovation to take place, it is the humans that must undertake it; and for society as a whole to be overhauled, it is humans that must see it done. That is the message of philosophical Marxism: it is both utopian (in that it shows how nothing is immutable) and scientific (in that it takes as basis the undeniable facts of survival in nature, and reasons purely materialistically). It is, in short, socialism.

¹For the origin of this phrase, see Friedrich Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (London 1880)
²See: G.V. Plekhanov, The Materialist Conception of History (Petrograd 1897), publ. in Novoye Slovo (Engl. transl. J. Katzer, London 1969)
³See: Jürgen Habermas, Zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft: Marxismus als Kritik, in Theorie und Praxis (Frankfurt 1963)
⁴It is essential at this point to note that technology is not necessarily the only way that the social productive forces can change: geographical, biological and climate aspects can do this too. But as Marx pointed out, the more developed the productive forces, the less this plays a role. Mountains and seas are great inhibitions for ancient peoples, but hardly so for peoples who can build airplanes and carrier groups! Except when you're playing Sid Meier's Civilization, that is.
⁵See: G.V. Plekhanov, The Role of the Individual in History (Petrograd 1898), publ. in Nauchnoye Obozrenie (Engl. transl. J. Katzer, London 1969)

PS: I hope to be able to further address the aspects of economic Marxism in another essay. These two should not be considered separate in content but are two sides of the same coin; yet it would take too much space and cause too much confusion to address that subject too at this time.
Posted by Matthijs Krul @ 00:32