Gedachten
Sunday, December 04, 2005
The Malaise of European Social-Democracy
In 1938, war threatened the then relatively new republican Austria. Its large northern neighbour Germany, in recent years reconstituted as a world power, had been appealing to the Austrians to join their nation as part of a larger ethnically German superstate, and it was working. The Austrian government, under the fascist leadership of Von Schusnigg, had an increasingly tough time resisting this pressure. So it decided to organize a referendum, in order to determine (as a show for the Germans) what the Austrians really wanted. The question of the referendum was subsequently to be arranged as the following: "Do you want a social Austria, a Christian Austria, a free and united Austria?" Obviously the intent of this was to associate as many hollow phrases with Austrian independence as possible, so that absolutely nobody could realistically answer no to the question.1 Hitler obviously did not accept this, and caused the referendum to be cancelled; Austria may have had the words, but the reality was in favor of the Germans. Almost immediately afterwards, Von Schusnigg resigned and Germany annexed the country.
The moral of the story is: do not rely on phrases alone for political success, but think always of the reality 'on the ground', or you may wake up one day and find yourself marginalized.
This is a lesson the European social-democratic parties would do well to remember. Ever since the end of the 1970s, resentment against the (almost always ruling) social-democrat parties of the various European nations has been increasing, leading to a series of sudden electoral upsets in the 1990s which saw the social-democrats lose enormous political ground to a medley of rightist populist movements. The shock of these ignominious defeats, both electorally and in the public debate, sent the old guard reeling, and the newer social-democrat politicians have been wondering how to proceed ever since.
There are two definite reasons for the massive losses suffered by the social-democrats in recent years (and the issues remain even there where the populists have lost ground, such as in the Netherlands). First is the immigration problem, second is the anti-establishment feeling. And the second is usually considered the less important factor. However, I would argue that in fact it is the second reason that is crucial, because it is directly related to the first in a way that reflects the changed nature of the social-democratic parties of modern Europe compared to their historical role.
The issue here is the following. Failures in effective immigration policy have caused concentrations of non-Western immigrants in the urban areas of Europe, and especially in those urban areas that were lower class neighbourhoods to begin with. These neighbourhoods have subsequently turned into a sort of pseudo-ghettos, with rampant crime and non-integration on the immigrant side, and an increasing feeling of alienation from what used to be "their own" country on the side of the original lower class population. Now the problem and the effects of the failed immigration policy in Western Europe are by now well-known, in the news and debate constantly, and I will not further describe them. Instead, I will point to a much-overlooked consequence of this structural change: the fact that it is the lower classes in Europe who bear the burden of immigration the most, combined with the fact that the social-democratic parties of these countries have largely been identified with the failed policies in the first place, and usually with justification, since in many nations they have been constant rulers or shadow rulers for all of the post-war history.
This leads to an interesting contradiction. The social-democrats always rely on the support of the lower classes for their numerical power, and claim to act in the name of those classes, invoking themes like "solidarity" and "welfare" to appeal to the less fortunate and those lacking in adequate opportunities in society. But the immigration problem and its results, namely crime and culture shock, bear disproportionately on this group. It is the people in the bad neighbourhoods who suffer by far the most from the crime prevalent in those neigbourhoods. It is the people who have saved money for years to buy a car just to have it broken into or stolen that suffer more than the manager whose leased Lexus is remunerated by his company. It is the labourer who has finally realized his dream of being a home-owner who suffers disproportionately from burglaries in bad neighbourhoods, whereas those in gated communities only pretend they do.
The net result is that the social-democratic parties have lost the support of the pillar of their party, the labouring classes, because they have ignored this issue for too long, or else inadequately addressed it. With a baffling arrogance, politicians who lived in large houses and had private drivers and dined with heads of labour unions in expensive restaurants would tell the labourers from the bad neighbourhoods that they would just have to live with the results of the failed immigration policies, and that whoever complained was racist or right-wing or otherwise disqualified from any further opinion. It is obviously easy to compliment yourself on your progressive and humanist views when you live in an area with less than 5% non-Western immigrants, and most of those university educated too.
The policies the social-democrat leaders came up with where as a result the policies favored by those living in such neighbourhoods: the policies of the independent middle class, high-educated, progressive, environmentally sensitive, people with great societal potential and usually an income at least twice the mean. Because those leaders assumed that they could pacify the lower classes by mentioning "solidarity" and opposing "neoliberalism" and whatever catchphrase was popular at the time, all the 'meat' of the actual policies of such parties was aimed at gaining the middle class vote: since the labourers' vote was assumed, all that was needed was the middle class vote to gain a majority to rule. And ruling came quite easy to the social-democrats.
Leaving the labourers in the cold cost them dearly. The rightist populist parties sprung up like mushrooms everywhere, and often led by disappointed and disillusioned social-democrats themselves, who turned rightist to salvage what was left of the old ideals of the Western European countries, ideals that used to be defended by the left but had now been so submerged in all the middle class appeal that it was scarcely mentioned at all by the traditional politicians: the interests of the lower classes and of the socialist view. Interestingly, many of these rightists turned away from leftism altogether not so much out of a feeling that it had been wrong all the time, but that leftism had abandoned them: an experience similar to the one suggested by Reagan to the Democrat voters in the 1980s, who were told that they had not swung right, but the Democrats had swung left. Only now it was the reverse, with the social-democrats going to the center so much that the labourers, who really experienced what the politicians merely dabbled in, felt abandoned and preferred a radical alternative on whatever side to the misery they were in. This last point is also reflected by polls held among the voters who used to be social-democrat but switched parties: a lot went to the rightist populists, yes, but a significant group also went to the radical left, something that is not often talked about by political analysts, but which becomes clearer when you consider the background.
How could the social-democrats have made this error? How could they have betrayed the interests of the working classes like this? It is because of the folly of empty words, the result of narrow thinking and narrow acting. As the French political scientist Jean-Yves Camus has described it, the social-democrats have essentially adopted the liberal worldview, under the pressure of wanting to achieve broad democratic (electoral) success. As he explains: "They talk of inevitabilities: globalization is inevitable, the market economy is inevitable, liberalism is inevitable, individualism is inevitable, centrism is inevitable. If you keep telling people that everything they experience is inevitable, they will want to revolt against that inevitability". Now it used to be the case that such revolts against false inevitabilities were in favor of those parties, but the social-democrats have so thoroughly adopted all liberal points of view that they have become part of the "inevitable" establishment; and as a result, the labourers revolt against them.
The same pattern can be seen in so-called socialist (and this all too often also includes the other leftist parties) programmes for political economic policy. They feel no need to explain their policies on a global scale beyond saying they are for "solidarity" or a "social Europe" or similar phrases. But what this means in reality is never explained. The reason is that they couldn't possibly explain it: since they have totally adapted the liberal, capitalist framework, they have no real way of explaining why they should oppose the workings of that capitalism on a global scale. In fact, soon enough they will find out they cannot explain why they should support a social welfare system either. After all, if capitalism etc. is inevitable, then what use is creating inefficiencies in it?
And this can also explain the so-called crisis of European identity. Most 'Europeans' by far are theoretically in favor of a united and peaceful Europe. At the same time, there's an increasing current of nationalism and resentment against the European Union, a resentment that is again aimed at the establishment. What has happened here is that the only thing the labouring classes have left, after having been told that their economic misfortune and their experiences of unsafety and constant fear and their increasingly uncertain position in a changing world are all "inevitable", is their national identity. Even when unemployed and living among Moroccan thugs and having no political recourse but resentment parties on the right, they still can identify as French or Dutch or Danish or whatever, and so assume something of the dignity that is inherent in that title. But the social-democrat politicians, in their infallible wisdom, have decided that this is also not the way to go: after all, the middle class, which sees its economic success increasingly rely on international opportunities and trade, is all in favor of all these processes. So they tell the labourers that it's their way or the highway, either Europe or nothing. And then they are surprised that whenever they actually deign to hold a referendum, their pet projects are massively rejected among the labourers, whom they are supposed to represent.
In the end, the populist right will not have any structural lasting power on the political stage. The votes for those parties, unlike in the US, are not based on actual political views but on the double resentment mentioned above. But as long as hollow words is all the social-democrats can offer to the lower classes, they may get their votes now and then, but they will never again have their trust, and the malaise of social-democracy in Europe will continue even if the electoral cycles go on as they always have.
Not that this has not been foreseen, of course. The Marxists already resisted the forming of social-democratic or "reformist" socialist parties at the end of the 19th century, as is shown convincingly in Marx' Kritik der Gothaer Programm. The whole idea of social-democracy is based on the idea of using parliamentary methods to appease the workers by giving them improved labour conditions, better housing, safety codes, etc. This would in turn 'soften' the effects of capitalism and so prevent revolutions and structural clashes.
But what was pointed out to them, and has been happening ever since, is that the project is self-defeating: as soon as the labourers have all these improved conditions, they will have no reason to oppose capitalism, since the capitalism they know is presumed to include these good conditions. Then in turn they will have no reason to support socialism, since it has nothing to offer to them that their 'capitalism' doesn't also provide. And that in turn will immensely strengthen the position of the capitalist and rightist movements, since they will be able to make the labourers think in the framework of capitalism, i.e. present it as a reality without alternatives (the dreaded "inevitability"). Then, in turn, the socialists must also adopt this framework if they are to maintain electoral power. So in the end, it merely causes the defeat of socialism and has gained nothing on a structural level.2
1 Something that was confirmed when some villages held the referendum anyway as the Wehrmacht had not arrived yet, and an average of 95% of the vote went in favor of Yes.
2One might ask: aren't the condition improvements a structural improvement? The Marxist answer is that capitalism by its very nature seeks to be efficient above all, and the social-democrat appeasements are inefficient. They therefore will not be maintained or will be maintained in such a way that it will not be anything beyond a way to keep the masses happy, so to speak. What victory is that? Eventually, capitalism will then globalize and globalize, remove all inefficiencies and cultural restrictions in its path to efficiency, and expand to its maximum point, after which its internal contradictions will cause its collapse. And voilà, we are exactly where we started: the original socialism. It will turn out everything else has been nothing but hollow words, though popular devoid of reality, just like the pretended "inevitability" of the Austrians' independence. It would go too far to explain this working within the text: but for the Marxist understanding of the "laws" of capitalism and the workings of its globalizing power (and why softening it cannot prevent this), I suggest reading the Communist Manifesto including Engels' 1888 English edition preface, as well as the Critique of the Political Economy.
